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ABSTRACT 
 
PRIVATIZATION OF FORESTS: A REAL OPTIONS APPROACH 
Siyahhan, Baran 
MSc., Department of Business Administration 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Selçuk Caner 
 
 
February 2005 
 
 
This thesis analyzes the privatization of forests. It suggests that privatization 
can be regarded as a real option. The thesis develops a model that determines 
the optimal conditions for privatization of forests. Working in a real option 
framework, I show that delaying privatization could have a positive value 
attached to it and obtain the critical value at which the government privatizes 
the forest. I also show that the fundamental variables in the economy such as 
the interest rate and uncertainty can affect the decision to privatize. 
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ÖZET 
 
ORMANLARIN ÖZELLEŞTİRİLMESİ: REEL OPSİYON YAKLAŞIMI 
Siyahhan, Baran 
Master, İşletme Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Asst. Prof. Selçuk Caner 
 
 
Şubat 2005 
 
 
Bu çalışma ormanların özelleştirilmesini incelemektedir. Çalışma, 
özelleştirmenin reel opsiyon olarak değerlendirilebileceğini anlatmaktadır. 
Tez, ormanların hangi koşullarda özelleştirilmesi gerektiğini gösteren bir 
model geliştirmektedir. Tez, reel opsiyon çerçevesinde, özelleştirmenin 
ertelenmesinin pozitif bir değeri olabileceğini kanıtlamakta ve devletin 
ormanı özelleştirmesi gereken eşik değerini bulmaktadır. Model, aynı 
zamanda, faiz oranı ve belirsizlik gibi temel ekonomik değişkenlerin 
özelleştirme kararı üzerinde etkili olduğunu göstermektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Reel Opsiyon, Özelleştirme, Ekonomik Rant, Çevresel 
Fayda  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Consider a risk-neutral government that plans on privatizing a forest land 
which provides a certain social benefit (amenity value) to the community and 
potential economic opportunities from the sale of timber. Exactly when and under 
what conditions should the government privatize the forest? What are the factors 
that the government must take into account before going ahead with the plan? 
How should the government resolve the decision to privatize? 
 
Although privatization is not a novel phenomenon, it is only in the past two 
decades that privatization movements have actually accelerated. Following the 
examples in the industrialized world, the developing countries soon adopted their 
own privatization programs. There are a number of motivating factors behind the 
privatization movements. The East European countries have mainly considered 
privatization as a tool to transform their countries into market economies whereas 
other developed and developing countries have privatized to achieve economic 
goals such as revenue generation and capital market development. Inefficiency of 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) is by far the most crucial and well-documented 
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argument for privatization (see, for instance, Donahue, 1989; Lopez de Silanes, 
1993 and Mueller, 1989). Privatization movements in Turkey also coincide with 
the trends observed in the last two decades across the world. The liberalization 
program announced in 1980 envisions the privatization of the SOEs with the 
objectives, among others, of stimulating the economy, strengthening the 
development of capital markets and increasing efficiency (Şımga-Muğan and 
Yüce, 2003).   
 
Privatization of forests has generated lively debates in several countries. The 
privatization of forests dates back to the 18th century in Scandinavian countries. 
The former communist countries have recently brought up the issue although not 
all have gone on with the privatization plans. The question as to whether forests 
should be privatized has also spurred a debate in Turkey with environmentalists 
expressing their concern for the future stock of forest. Environmentalists are 
particularly concerned about the loss of endemic species and biodiversity. While 
the environmental concerns regarding the preservation and protection are well 
understood, economic benefits of preservation are understood less. It is 
particularly important to recognize the multidimensional nature of the problem. 
Forests are part of national wealth. As such, they bear a substantial value that 
entails both environmental and economic benefits. Economically, forests can be 
an important source of exports especially for developing countries. The Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates, for instance, that demand for wood 
and timber products will have grown by 2.2 billion m3 by 2010, corresponding to 
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a 2% increase per annum1. Furthermore, forests are rich in plants that can be used 
for alimentary and medicinal purposes. Forest dwellers in many countries 
constitute yet another group who earn their livelihood from forests. Conversion of 
forests to agricultural use has economic implications and has been a controversial 
issue in many countries. Therefore, production of forests and forestry products is 
an economic process where optimal use of resources is dictated by economic 
theory. It is clear that the public at large should be interested in the optimum use 
of forests. However, the fact that multiple stakeholders are involved makes the 
management of forests a complex issue. In the event of a conflict between private 
and public interests, the economic use of forests should be regulated since no 
party has a license to use public resources for private purposes without paying 
appropriate prices which are to be determined based on the underlying value of 
the natural resources. Sustainable forest management, therefore, must formulate 
policies so that benefits derived from forests are not diminished. In other words, 
the challenge a government faces is not to prevent the harvesting of forests but to 
ensure via sustainable forest management that national wealth (rather than wealth 
of a single stakeholder) is maximized. Maximization of national wealth, in turn, 
requires an economic analysis that weighs the benefits of any policy against its 
costs.  
 
One important aspect of sustainable forest management and economic 
analysis is property rights. The state must determine the ownership structure of 
forests. The recent trend is towards private ownership. However, if privatization 
                                                 
1 Inderfor Ltd. “Forest Creation: Investment Opportunities in Argentina”, Food and Agriculture 
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is perceived as depletion of resources, it would not be economically efficient. 
Efficient management of forestry resources including private use would increase 
the value of stock of forestry. By privatizing forests, governments aim to reduce 
bureaucracy, induce competition and promote more accountability and thereby 
increase the value of stock of forestry.2 The Scandinavian experience shows that 
privatization of forests does not necessarily end in the destruction of forests so 
long as clear rules are set and abided by. The Swedish case is particularly 
exemplary. Although forests are privatized in Sweden, tree volume growth 
exceeds harvests by about 30% and the regeneration process works well.3 The 
Finnish experience in managing forests is equally striking. About 60% of forests 
in Finland are owned by private institutions or persons. There has not been, 
however, a decrease in the total area covered by forests. About three quarters of 
Finnish land is covered by forests which constitute a substantial export value for 
the country. Due to the efficient management of forests, the increase in stock has 
always exceeded harvesting volumes or drain4.  
   
I develop a model where the government evaluates the decision to privatize 
forests. Specifically, I determine the optimal time and the critical value of the 
forest at which the government privatizes. The model explicitly takes into account 
the environmental and economic factors that affect the value of the forest to the 
community as a whole. The model explicitly determines the critical value that the 
government must take into account in its decision to privatize.  I use the real 
                                                                                                                                     
Organization, “Forestry Statistics-Today for Tomorrow” 
2 FAO, “The Challenge of Forest Management”, Chapter 6, 1993 
3 B. Hagglund “Sweden: Using the Forest as a Renewable Resource”, Unasylva, No:167, 1991 
4 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of Finland 
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options theory outlined by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Valuation is key to natural 
resource management. NPV methods do not take into account uncertainties and 
the value of the options that are part of the value of natural resources. Thus, using 
real options, one can avoid subsidizing private interests or benefits in a land 
concession. The fundamental idea behind the model is that the government has an 
“option” to privatize forests. This option is similar to a financial put option where 
the buyer has the right (but not the obligation) to sell the underlying asset at a pre-
specified price. In determining the optimal time and conditions for privatization, 
the government solves an optimal stopping problem. At each point in time, the 
government has to decide whether to maintain public ownership (i.e. continue to 
delay privatization) or to privatize (i.e. stop and obtain the “termination payoff” 
or the privatization price). The fact that government evaluates its decision at each 
point in time ensures continuous revision and update of the forestry policy. 
Furthermore, the model allows for long-term policy evaluation. Long-term 
orientation is particularly important for forestry sector since short-run orientation 
may conceal the long-term benefits. Focusing merely on short-run benefits may 
cause excessive harvesting of the forest. This can be a threat to the community as 
the forest’s capacity to provide goods and services is diminished over the long-
run.  
 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature on real 
options and privatization. The model is developed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 
concludes and discusses some avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Literature on Real Options  
 
 
 
Earliest studies on the application of options theory were done by Black and 
Scholes (1973). Merton (1973) generalized the options theory. This also coincides 
with the period during which researchers increasingly began to take note of the 
unrealistic features of the conventional discounted cash flow method (so often 
referred to as the NPV rule in standard finance textbooks) proposed by Dean 
(1951) and Bierman and Smidt (1960) based on the work of Fisher (1907). The 
conventional approach does not take into account, among others, the 
irreversibility of the investment (the fact that the initial investment cost is at least 
partially sunk), the uncertainty over the future cash flows of the investment and 
the flexibility in the timing of the investment (delaying the investment until 
factors that may act upon the investment ameliorate or abandoning the project 
altogether, rather than considering the investment only as a “now-or-never” 
decision).  
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Among the early papers that study these issues are those of Cukierman 
(1980) and Bernanke (1983) who deal with the postponement of irreversible 
investment decisions and Tourinho (1979) and Brock, Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1982) who consider the investment in natural resources. In the past two decades, 
real options theory was applied to a variety of areas of interest such as capital 
budgeting, strategic entry and capacity choices and exhaustible and inexhaustible 
natural resources. Majd and Pindyck (1987) investigate the implications of real 
options theory for capital budgeting decisions when investment is irreversible and 
not instantaneous (i.e. the project takes time to complete). McDonald and Siegel 
(1985) study project evaluation with the option to shut down while McDonald and 
Siegel (1986) and Myers and Majd (1983) dwell upon the valuation of 
investments and scrapping opportunities. 
 
One essential feature of the real options is that it allows for the assessment of 
decisions on physical investments. For instance, Pindyck (1988), Williams (1991) 
and Trigeorgis (1996) consider the capacity choice and operational flexibility 
while Smith and McCardle (1996) look at the flexibilities in the exploration stage. 
More recently, Auguerrevere (2003) studies the effects of competitive interactions 
on investment decisions and on the dynamics of the price of a nonstorable 
commodity in a model of incremental investment with time to build and operating 
flexibility. 
 
The real options are increasingly being used in modeling strategic choices in 
a competitive market. The basic question is whether a firm should invest in an 
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industry characterized by competition. The firm facing competition has to assess 
whether it is worth using the preemptive advantage by entering the market (or 
increasing capacity) first or whether it is more apt to delay the investment (option 
value of postponement) and risk being the follower in the market. However, this 
strand of work takes off in the 1990s. Smets (1991) examines irreversible market 
entry for a duopoly with stochastic demand while Grenadier (1996) considers the 
strategic exercise of options applied to real estate markets and Weeds (2000) 
dwells upon the real options nature of investments when there is competition and 
preemption advantages.  
 
The option-like characteristic of resource reserves is recognized in Tourinho 
(1979). He is the first to point out to the options in natural resources with 
applications to mining and oil industries. Paddock et al. (1986) extend the 
financial option theory to develop a model to price licenses in offshore drilling of 
petroleum and natural gas reserves. It is now common to value licenses for 
offshore oil reserves or mine fields as a compound American call option (see, 
among others, Paddock et al., 1988; Bjerksund and Ekern, 1991; Pickles and 
Smith, 1993; Smit,1997; and Davis and Schantz, 2000). Brennan and Schwartz 
(1985) and Slade (2001) apply the option valuation technique to the mining 
industry which closely resembles the oil industry. The real options theory is also 
adapted to investment in forestry. The decision problem is to optimally harvest a 
given stock of forest for commercial use including timber and construction 
development (see, for instance, Morck et al., 1989; Conrad, 1997 and Insley, 
2002). In addition, the optimal timing for harvesting is addressed in these studies.  
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In all these studies, it is almost standard to consider the real options in 
investments from the perspective of the private firms. Although the specific 
context of the problem changes across studies (be it a firm investing in a resource 
reserve or a company that attempts to optimally enter a new market in a 
competitive environment) the fundamental problem solved remains to be that of a 
private firm and the public regulator is often neglected. Therefore, it comes as no 
surprise that the investments are usually considered as compound American calls.  
 
 
2.2. Literature on Privatization  
 
 
 
Although privatization is an option of the government which depends on 
proper valuation, the literature on privatization is mostly characterized by 
empirical studies. On the theoretical side, the effect of political considerations is 
of interest in the literature. The study of Boycko et al. (1996), which can be 
considered as one of the landmarks in the literature, sees privatization as a tool 
that can reduce inefficiency imposed on by politicians. It has been argued in the 
literature that privatization should “draw a line” between politicians and the firms 
to increase efficiency. Schmidt (1990) and Shapiro and Willig (1990) demonstrate 
this latter point through an information argument. More recently, Biais and Perotti 
(2002) and Alexeev and Kaganovich (2001) analyze the role of politically 
motivated agents in the privatization process and the firm efficiency. 
  
 10 
Another strand of studies has concentrated on the optimal auctions in 
privatization. Cornelli and Li (1997), for instance, inspect the tradeoff between 
revenue maximization and efficiency considerations when the government 
auctions a public enterprise in the presence of foreign buyers. Similarly, Maskin 
and Riley (1989) consider the optimal number of shares that should be offered to 
a potential buyer. Laffont and Tirole (1993) study the optimal scheme of 
privatization by introducing a policy tool that monitors the performance of the 
firm to balance between revenue maximization and economic efficiency after 
privatization. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Katz and Owen (1997, 
2002) focus attention on voucher privatizations that were particularly popular in 
Eastern Europe, notably in the Czech Republic and the Soviet Union. 
 
Alternatively, Dharkadwar et al. (2000) argue that the principal-agent 
problem is at the heart of the ineffectiveness of several privatized firms and 
provide a model based on agency theory to increase post-privatization 
effectiveness. Errunza and Mazumdar (2001), to which this thesis is most related, 
analyze privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) as a put option for the 
government. The implicit put option formulation enables them to develop several 
policy options in the sale and sequencing of the sale of SOEs. 
 
Empirical studies measuring the impact of privatization and comparing the 
performance of the public firm with that of the private firm have proliferated 
particularly after the spread of privatization in the early 1980s (see, among others, 
Donahue, 1989; Mueller, 1989; Megginson et al., 1994 and Boubakri and Cossett, 
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1998). Other areas of interest are the macroeconomic effects of privatization 
(Boutchkova and Megginson, 2000 and Perotti and van Oijen, 2001) and the 
methods of or trends in privatization movements (Kikeri et al. 1992; Perotti, 
1995; Jones et al. 1999 and Biais and Perotti, 2002). Megginson and Netter 
(2001) provide a good review of the privatization literature with emphasis on the 
empirical studies. 
 
This thesis develops a model of privatization as a real option. It assesses the 
optimal conditions for the privatization of forests where the social benefit and the 
potential revenue the forest creates are the arguments of an implicit put option. In 
that sense, it establishes a link between the real option literature and the 
privatization literature. The model builds on Errunza and Mazumdar’s (2001) 
notion that privatization is a put option. I show that Dixit and Pindyck’s (1994) 
methodology can be used to solve the model suggested by Errunza and Mazumdar 
(2001). Use of real options to model divestment decisions is new to the literature. 
Although there are studies that consider entry and exit decisions, the emphasis is 
more on entry in a market in the presence of competition than on exit from the 
market. Therefore, the basic question in these studies is whether the firm should 
exercise its call option. The model developed in the subsequent pages changes the 
nature of the problem. The question is to optimally divest a renewable resource. 
Therefore, the government holds a put option rather than a call option from the 
start. Use of put options rather than call options changes the analysis of Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994) although the insights are the same (e.g. the government takes into 
account the opportunity cost of privatization). Furthermore, the model is closely 
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related to Brennan and Schwartz (1985) who develop a general model for natural 
resource investments and Morck et al. (1989) who study valuation of forestry 
resources. Like these studies, the model developed in the thesis also deals with a 
renewable resource. In other words, regeneration of forests must be accounted for 
in the model and this results in partial differential equations similar to those in 
Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and Morck et al. (1989). It is, nevertheless, 
possible to extend the model to nonrenewable resources and any other public 
asset that the government plans to privatize. 
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CHAPTER 3: MODELING PRIVATIZATION OF FORESTS 
 
3.1. The Model 
 
 
 
Before responding to questions raised in Introduction, I first formulate the 
problem the government faces and define the factors that it will take into account 
when executing the privatization plan. In the subsequent pages, I develop a model 
based on real options outlined by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The model developed 
by Dixit and Pindyck (henceforth referred to as DP) incorporates irreversibility of 
initial investment, uncertainty affecting the variables of investment and 
flexibilities of waiting and abandoning investment. Through dynamic 
programming and contingent claims analysis, DP model investment as a call 
option and determine the value of delaying investment. The value of waiting 
reflects the price the firm would pay in order to delay investment. In other words, 
the value of waiting is an opportunity cost of investing and must be included in 
the overall cost of investment. The firm invests immediately only if the full cost 
of investment (i.e. initial investment and opportunity cost of waiting) is less than 
the expected cash flow from investment. When the expected cash flow falls short 
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of the full cost, the firm waits. The value of the project may thus be increased. 
The reasoning in investment decision is closely associated with the reasoning in 
financial markets. In the context of financial options, higher values of options 
imply postponement of exercise. Similarly, higher value of the opportunity cost 
(i.e. the value of waiting) implies postponement of investment. This basic notion 
can be incorporated into almost any setting such as investment in imperfect 
competition and sequential investment. A simple exercise is useful to illustrate 
that the opportunity cost of investment could be significant5. Suppose that a firm 
is considering an instantaneous investment opportunity that has an initial 
investment of $1000. If the firm decides to undertake the project, it can sell the 
output for $100 today. Assume, however, that the price of the product will be 
either $50 or $150 in the next period with equal probability. Assume also that the 
price will remain at the new level thereafter. According to the conventional NPV 
analysis, the firm should invest if the expected future cash flow from investment 
is positive. In the present context, assuming that the interest rate is 10%, the firm 
decides to invest since  
∑∞
=
=+−=+−=
0
10011001000
)1.1(
1001000
t
tNPV  
With the conventional NPV analysis, however, the firm ignores the opportunity 
cost of investing today. In other words, the firm has the option to wait another 
year and eliminate the price uncertainty. The firm would invest only if the price 
next period turned out to be $150. The NPV of the project if the firm waits 
another year is  
                                                 
5 The example is based on Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Chapter 2 
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The firm is clearly better off if it waits another year because the opportunity cost 
of investing today is large. Put another way, the full cost of the investment is not 
$1000 but $1295>$1100. Since the full cost of the investment is greater than the 
expected future cash flow today, the firm should keep its option to delay 
investment and invest only if the price next period goes up.  
 
In this thesis, I show that the same approach can be used to model divestment 
decisions such as privatization. Privatization (and divestment decisions for that 
matter) is similar to a financial put option where the owner of the option has the 
right to sell the underlying asset. In the current context, the government has 
flexibility with regard to the privatization of forests. This flexibility has a value. 
Specifically, the government has the option to sell (privatize) the forest. If the 
government decides to privatize, it receives the bid price (i.e. the strike price) and 
delivers the forest (i.e. the underlying asset). If the government decides to 
maintain its ownership, it does not exercise its option. Therefore, the payoff from 
privatization is either the bid price less the value of the forest or zero. This is the 
same pattern of payoff that one would derive from a put option. The counter party 
of the contract, the private firm, buys the forest in anticipation of future benefits 
such as exporting timber and developing theme parks. 
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Errunza and Mazumdar (2001) are the first to model the costs and benefits of 
privatization as part of a complex option. In their context, the European put 
option reflects the government guarantee on the debt of an SOE. That is, 
),,( VT
rT
T FVPeFD σ−= −  
where FT is the face value of the debt, V is the value of the SOE assets with 
volatility Vσ . The value of the European put, P, denotes the default risk premium 
of the debtholders. The face value of the debt, FT, serves as the strike price of the 
put and the value of the assets of the firm, V, is similar to the value of the 
underlying stock. Errunza and Mazumdar then obtain the equity value of the 
private firm and the public firm to analyze the effects of privatization on such 
factors as efficiency and voting control. 
 
The model developed in this thesis, as opposed to the model of Errunza and 
Mazumdar, indicates the optimal conditions under which the government should 
use its option to privatize forests. First, I solve the model assuming no 
uncertainty. When there is no uncertainty, it is straightforward to solve for the 
optimal time to privatize. Subsequently, I introduce uncertainty into the model. 
Instead of solving for the optimal time to privatize, I use the contingent claims 
analysis of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) to obtain the critical value of the forest that 
would induce the government to privatize the forest. This critical value 
determines whether or not the forest bears more value to the community if 
privatized.  
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Before going into the details of the model, I first introduce the variables of 
the model. The government owns, as an asset, a piece of forest whose value 
evolves stochastically. It is common in the literature to view the value of the 
forest, V, as following a stochastic process (see, for instance, Morck et al., 1989 
and Alvarez and Koskela, 2001).More formally, it evolves according to: 
 
dztVbdttVadV ),(),( +=                                                                                      (1) 
 
where dz is the increment of a Brownian motion, a(V,t) is the drift term which is 
the expected change in the value of the natural resource, E(dV) = a(V,t) and b(V,t) 
is the standard deviation or, rather, the variance rate such that var(dV) = b2(V,t). 
 
The intrinsic value is a function of the potential rent, the social benefit and 
the growth rate of the forest over time. Specifically, the intrinsic value of the 
forest can be influenced by unforeseen ecological events such as the appearance 
of harmful insects or radical changes in the amount of rainfall, and by the 
economic factors, in particular, the economic rent. Economic rent is defined as 
the surplus value created during the production of a good or a service6. In other 
words, economic rent is the profit one earns above the opportunity cost. It is 
usually hard to create economic rent from many economic activities because other 
producers are likely to enter the market once economic rent is created. However, 
this need not be true for natural resource investments. Governments usually lease 
the right to extract resources to a certain firm. Hence, other companies are 
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prohibited from entering the market. Furthermore, the fact that resources occur 
naturally considerably reduces the cost of production. Therefore, natural 
resources bear a great potential for creating economic rent. In the context of 
forestry resources, economic rent captures the changes in prices of forest products 
such as timber. In other words, it reflects the uncertain cash flows from harvesting 
the forest. The economic rent will be taken as stochastic after Samuelson (1965). 
The stochastic revenue process is commonly used in the literature (see, for 
example, Morck et al. 1989 and Insley, 2001) as well as studies that model the 
cost as the stochastic variable (Sarkar, 2003). The revenue (sales) stream is 
assumed to have a lognormal process as in equation (2)7. 
 
 dR = αR(R, t)Rdt + σR(R,t)RdzR                                                                           (2)      
 
where αR is the drift term, σR denotes the uncertainty and dzR is the increment of a 
Wiener process. 
 
The second component of the intrinsic value of the forest is the social benefit 
or the amenity value of the forest. In the literature, it is standard to define amenity 
value of the forest as the non-timber benefits or functions derived from a standing 
forest (see, for instance, Scarpa et al., 2000, Adamowicz et al., 1996 and Sharma, 
1992). The most recognized elements of the amenity value include climate, flood 
                                                                                                                                     
6 Whiteman, “Economic Rent from Forest Operations in Suriname and a Proposal for Revising                    
Suriname’s Forest Revenue Sysytem” 1999, FAO, Rome. 
7 Despite the studies that reveal the superiority of a mean-reverting process over the lognormal 
process (Lund, 1993; Hassett and Metcalf, 1995 and Schwartz, 1997), the use of the geometric 
Brownian motion is common in the literature (Brennan and Schwartz, 1985; McDonald and 
Siegel, 1986 and Dixit, 1989a). 
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control, recreational and hunting activities and biodiversity. Given the non-cash 
nature of some of the components of the amenity value, the amenity value of 
forests is usually assessed through the indices such as the naturalness index that 
reflect the amenities8. Scarpa et al. (2000) assess amenity value of the forests by 
subtracting the actual harvesting rate from the rate at which the forest would be 
cut had the owner of the forest maximized the timber revenues. Another common 
method used to measure amenity value is to monetarize the non-timber benefits 
by assessing how much people would be willing to pay for recreation (see, for 
instance, Willis, 1991; Kramer et al., 1992 and Elsasser, 1996). There are studies 
in the literature that take amenity as stochastic (see, for instance, Conrad, 1997; 
Forsyth, 2000 and Reed, 1993). Unforeseen ecological events such as the 
appearance of harmful insects or acid rains are likely to influence the value of the 
forest. Therefore, following Reed (1993), I will assume that the amenity value of 
the forest also follows a lognormal process: 
 
dA = αA(A, t)Adt + σA(A,t)AdzA                    (3) 
 
where αA is the drift term, σA denotes the uncertainty and dzA is the increment of a 
Wiener process. 
 
The amenity value of the forest and the economic can be related. For instance, 
in response to an increase in the price of timber, the amenity value of the forest 
may decline since it would pay more to harvest and sell timber in the market. On 
                                                 
8 See, among others, Scarpa et al., 2000 and Raunikar and Buongiorno, 2001. 
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the other hand, both the amenity value and the economic rent may increase 
together due to scarcity in resources. Hence, the correlation between the amenity 
value and the economic rent, denoted by ρAR, may be positive or negative. I will 
assume, for ease of exposition, that amenity and economic rent are independent; 
hence, ρAR = 0. However, the model can incorporate non-zero correlation. 
 
Another important factor that the government must consider is the forest 
volume. In other words, the government must realize and take into account that 
forests are a renewable resource. Tree growth determines the volume of available 
timber for sale.  The rate of growth is also important for the amenities of the 
forest. As the tree volume increases, the community is expected to benefit more 
from the amenities of the forest. The change in growth is assumed to be 
deterministic based on Kilkki and Vaisanen, (1969) and Clark, (1976).  
 
dX = g(t)dt                                                                  (4) 
 
where g(t) is a positive, concave function of time. Equation (4) reflects the fact 
that tree growth is slow and takes time. 
 
The ability of the government to decide on privatization creates an additional 
value to the intrinsic value of the resource. The total asset value of the forest must 
reflect this additional value. Therefore, the total asset value of the forest, E(t), is 
the sum of the intrinsic value of the forest outlined above and the value of 
government’s option to privatize the forest. The option to privatize can be  
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Table 1. Correspondence between a Put Option and Privatization 
 
PUT OPTION PRIVATIZATION 
Stock Price (V) Value of the forest 
Exercise price (K) Privatization price 
Time to expiration (t) Infinity (due to perpetual option)  
Volatility of stock price (σ ) Volatility of the value of the forest 
Dividend on stock Social benefit/Amenity value 
 
regarded as a perpetual American put option. More specifically, the government 
holds the right to sell (privatize) the asset (the forest, whose value is V) at any 
time at a predetermined price, K, the exercise price. The correspondence between 
the privatization variables and put options is illustrated in Table 1. The total value 
of the forest can now be written as follows: 
 
),,(),,,()( σKVPtXARVtE +=                                                                           (5) 
 
where E(t) denotes the total asset value of the forest over time, t, R is the implicit 
rent to be defined later, A stands for the amenity  value of the forest, P denotes the 
value of the perpetual American put option and σ is the uncertainty coefficient. 
Other variables are V and K. The government is assumed to incur a certain 
maintenance cost, C, so long as it owns the forest. This paper assumes that K, the 
privatization price, is the present value of all future costs; that is,
i
C
K t
t∑
= , 
where i is the appropriate discount rate. Note that this formulation has a clear 
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analogy to capital-investment relationship. In particular, the privatization price is 
taken to be a stock variable whose value derives from the capitalized future cost, 
the flow variable. It is assumed that the government determines the privatization 
price. There is growing literature on the determination of privatization prices (see, 
for instance, Lopez-de-Silanes, 1997 and Aggarwal and Harper, 2000). However, 
one is also interested in knowing when the government should start the 
privatization program given the factors such as the amenity value and the 
potential economic rent. Assuming that there is no information asymmetry in the 
economy, the privatization price is known to private firms. In other words, the 
privatization price, K, is the reserve price of the government. The government 
would not accept a bid price below K. Note that the results do not change if the 
actual bid is higher than K. It is nevertheless possible to extend the model by 
relaxing the assumption of fixed K and introducing a quality variable such that the 
privatization price increases as the quality of timber ameliorates.  
 
It is assumed that the government does not seek to profit from harvesting and 
the sale of timber. Its goal is rather to provide social benefit reflected in the 
amenity value of the forest. However, the government also takes into 
consideration the potential rent that might be extracted from the forest. If the 
amenity value is such that the economic rent becomes relatively significant then 
the government considers the privatization plan which also translates into revenue 
for itself. In brief, the government seeks to maximize the value of the asset it 
owns and attempts to solve the following optimization problem: 
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( ) ( )[ ]



 +∫
∞
0
,,max dtKVPtVE σ  
subject to                                                               (6) 
dR = αR(R, t)Rdt + σR(R,t)RdzR 
dA = αA(A, t)Adt + σA(A,t)AdzA      
dX = g(t)dt 
 
where E designates the expectation operator.   
 
In (6), the government maximizes the total value of the forest subject to the 
constraints on the control variables. The variables in the constraints are assumed 
to be uncorrelated. 
 
Next, the motion that governs the stochastic value of the forest, V, must be 
specified. As argued above, the value of the forest is a function of economic rent, 
amenity, growth and time:  
 
V = V(R, A, X, t)                                     (7) 
 
The motion for the value of the forest can be obtained by expanding equation 
(7) using Ito’s lemma. 
 
))(()(
2
1)(
2
1 22 dAdRVdAVdRVdtVdXVdAVdRVdV RAAARRtXAR ++++++=  
 
Substituting for dR, dA and dX, we get 
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[ ] [ ]
dtRAVdtVA
dtVRdtVdtVtgAdzAdtVRdzRdtVdV
RAARRAAAA
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++
++++++=
22
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Rearranging the above, 
 
AAA
RRRAAARRRtXAARR
dzAV
dzRVdtVAVRVVtgAVRVdV
σ
σσσαα
+
+

 +++++= 2222
2
1
2
1)(
 
AVARVRV VdzVdzVdtdV σσα ++=                                        (8) 
where 


 +++++= AAARRRtXAARRV VAVRVVtgAVRVV
2222
2
1
2
1)(1 σσααα                         (9)  
[ ]RRVR RVV σσ
1=                                        (10) 
and  
[ ]AAVA AVV σσ
1=                   (11) 
 
Equation (8) shows that the change in the value of the forest is also 
stochastic. The uncertainty in the value of the forest stems from both amenity and 
economic rent. In equation (10), Vα  is the expected rate of change in the value of 
the forest. VRσ  and VAσ  capture the uncertainty in the value of the forest related to 
economic rent and amenity, respectively. Equation (8) is fundamental to the 
solution of the problem. Next, I discuss the solution of the problem in the 
deterministic case. 
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3.2. The Deterministic Case 
 
 
 
I start with the simple case where there is no uncertainty affecting the 
variables of the model. Although option valuation depends on the volatility of the 
underlying asset, the analysis in this section is useful for two reasons. First, it 
demonstrates that the flexibility regarding the timing of privatization has a value, 
which is ignored in the conventional NPV analysis. Second, it allows one to 
assess the role of uncertainty in the economy once uncertainty is introduced into 
the model. 
 
When there is no uncertainty in the economy, the problem simplifies to a first 
order ordinary differential equation from which I obtain the value of option to 
wait. Since there is no uncertainty and hence VAVR σσ = = 0, equation (8) reduces 
to: 
 
dV = αvVdt                 (12) 
 
Integrating (12), I obtain the function for V(t): 
 
V(t) = V0eαvt                      (13) 
where V(0) = V0 
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When the intrinsic value of the forest is given by equation (13), the value of 
the option at the privatization date can be written as: 
 
P(V) = max [(K – VT)e-rT,0]                               (14) 
 
where r is the risk-free rate. Note that the appropriate discount rate is the risk-free 
rate since the government is assumed to be risk-neutral. 
 
Equation (14) can also be seen as the payoff to the government of 
privatization at T. If the government privatizes the forest, it receives the 
privatization price K in return for the forest that has a time T value of VT. If the 
government does not privatize, it does not realize the payoff.  
 
Substituting equation (13) into equation (14), we end up with equation (15): 
 
P(V) = (K – VeαvT)e-rT                     (15) 
 
Equation (15) is the value today of privatization at some arbitrary time T 
given the current value of the forest, V. A closer inspection of equation (15) 
allows one to assess whether the government would privatize the forest today or 
would rather wait before privatization given the option to wait. In other words, 
there may be a value to waiting. The decision when to privatize depends on the 
sign of αv, the expected growth rate of the value of the forest.  
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Figure 1. K<V 
 
Assume first that αv > 0. This implies that the value of the forest is an 
increasing function of time. The value of the forest can increase over time due to 
a rise in timber prices and/or an increase in the amenities of forest. The decision 
to privatize depends on the initial values of the privatization price, K, and V. If  
K<V initially, the government never privatizes the forest since the payoff from 
privatization is negative. Figure 1 illustrates this case. When K>V initially, it does 
not pay to postpone privatization since V(t) is an increasing function of time. In 
other words, the payoff from privatization decreases if the government waits. 
Figure 2 illustrates the case where the privatization price is greater than the value 
of the forest initially. In brief, when the value of the forest is expected to increase  
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Figure 2. K>V 
 
over time, the government either privatizes immediately or never privatizes the 
forest. The payoff from privatization is hence P(V) = max [K-V,0]. 
 
Suppose now that αv < 0 implying that the expected change in the value of the 
forest in equation (8) is negative. This, in turn, implies that the value of the forest, 
V(t), is a decreasing function of time. The value of the forest can decline over 
time due to a decrease in timber prices or amenities of the forest. For instance, a 
road construction or the development of an industry near a forest may result in the 
cutting of trees and hence reduce the forest’s amenity value. Even if K<V 
initially, P(V) > 0 since value of the forest eventually falls below the privatization  
price. To find the optimal time to privatize, the government maximizes the value  
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Figure 3.  Privatization when the Forest Value Declines 
 
of the put in equation (15) with respect to T. The first-order condition with respect 
to T is  
 
0)()( )( =−+−= −−− TrVrT VVerrKedT
VdP αα                (16) 
 
Solving equation (16) yields9 
 



 −−= 0,)(ln1max*
rK
VrT V
V
α
α                (17) 
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Figure 4. Value of Put to Privatize 
 
In equation (17), if the privatization price, K, is not too much larger than the 
value of the forest, V, the government does not privatize immediately. In other 
words, T*>0. This is shown in Figure 3. To find the critical value of forest at 
which the government privatizes the forest, we only need to set T* = 0. Doing so 
yields 
 
K
r
rKV
V
<−= α
*                   (18) 
 
With the critical value of the forest, V*, in hand, we only need to substitute 
the expression for T* into equation (15) to obtain the value of option to privatize. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
9 The second order condition is verified in Appendix A. 
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Table 2. Optimal Policies for Privatization of Forests 
 
 K>V K<V 
αV<0 Wait to Privatize Wait to Privatize 
αV>0 Immediate Privatization No Privatization 
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V
V
r
V
V
α
αα α
            (19) 
 
Equation (19) shows that the conventional NPV analysis does neglect the 
opportunity cost associated with the postponement of privatization. The 
government privatizes the forest when the value of the forest declines below the 
critical value, V*. If, on the other hand, the value of the forest is greater than the 
critical value, it pays to delay privatization. In other words, the flexibility 
regarding the privatization has a positive value. Figure 4 shows the value of the 
option to privatize. As expected, the value of option to privatize is similar to a 
financial put option. The value of the option to privatize declines steadily as the 
value of the forest increases. When the value of the put reaches zero, it no longer  
pays to hold the option and the government privatizes. Table 2 summarizes the 
policy implications of the privatization program. In short, when the value of the 
forest is decreasing over time, the government waits until the payoff from 
privatization is maximized. When the value of the forest increases over time, the 
government either privatizes immediately or never privatizes depending on the 
values of K and V.   
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3.3. The Stochastic Case 
 
 
 
Next, I analyze the value of a put option when the value of the assets (i.e. the 
value of the forest) changes randomly through contingent claims analysis (CCA). 
I assume a nonzero variance term in equation (8), i.e. σVR>0 and σVA>0 
throughout this section.  
 
Before going into the details of the contingent claims analysis, it should be 
noted that the contingent claims analysis rests on the assumption of complete 
markets. Existence of complete markets implies that there are pure securities 
(also known as the Arrow-Debreu securities) in the market that pay $1 in some 
state and nothing in the other states of the nature. In other words, existence of 
complete markets ensures that the security space is spanned by the pure 
securities. Spanning is a crucial assumption because it implies that either a single 
asset or a portfolio of assets in the market can replicate the risk and return 
characteristics of the value of the forest. In other words, spanning implies that the 
value of the hypothetical asset or portfolio is perfectly correlated with the value of 
the forest and that V can be regarded as the price of the asset (portfolio) in the 
market. Hence, the behavior of the value process of the forest is assumed to be 
similar to the behavior of stocks in financial markets. This is not an excessively 
restrictive assumption as it might at first seem. The assumption is realistic for 
commodities that are actually traded in the market such as oil, copper and timber. 
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Furthermore, one need not search for a specific group of assets that would mimic 
the risk and return characteristics. It suffices that the value of the forest is 
replicated by a portfolio of assets (regardless of specific stocks) with a self-
financing strategy. Since markets are complete, one can obtain any risk and return 
characteristics with the pure securities. If markets are not complete so that such a 
replicating portfolio cannot be formed, the model can be solved through dynamic 
programming. The results, however, do not change if a solution is obtained 
through dynamic programming rather than contingent claims analysis. The 
advantage of using contingent claims analysis over dynamic programming is that 
it avoids the identification of a subjective discount rate that reflects the risk 
aversion of the decision-maker10.    
 
 Suppose that Y is a portfolio whose value is perfectly correlated with the 
value of the forest, V. According to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the 
return on the hypothetical portfolio is: 
 
µ = r + ΦρYMσ               (20) 
 
where µ is the risk-adjusted return on the hypothetical portfolio, Φ is the market 
price of risk, ρYM is the correlation of the portfolio Y with the market portfolio and 
r is the exogenous risk-free discount rate. Note that since portfolio Y is perfectly 
correlated with the value of the forest, V, ρYM = ρVM. One crucial assumption to 
make at this point is that the expected change in the value of the forest, Vα , is 
                                                 
10 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for the comparison of dynamic programming and CCA. 
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equal to the risk-adjusted return, µ. To see why the equality should hold, consider 
the case where µ = Vα  + δ without loss of generality. The latter equation implies 
that the risk-adjusted return on the stock is equal to the sum of the expected 
change in the value of the asset, Vα , and an indirect return, δ. δ can be thought of 
as the convenience yield on a real asset (e.g. a tree that grows more wood) or a 
dividend on the underlying stock. If δ were nonzero, the stock price would be 
expected to fall by the dividend amount. The holder of the put option would not 
exercise early because there is a positive probability that the option will go deeper 
in the money. In other words, probability of early exercise of an American put on 
a dividend paying stock decreases. Such a case implies that the government 
would hold on to its option to privatize rather than exercising it. 
 
With these assumptions, it is now possible to obtain solution a using the no 
arbitrage condition. Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994), I first form a riskless 
portfolio composed of the option to privatize and an asset whose value is 
perfectly correlated with the value of the forest. Since the option to privatize is 
similar to a financial put option, the portfolio should hold the option to privatize 
and PV units of the asset. Note that this is much like a portfolio held in the 
financial markets: holding a stock which provides positive return if the stock price 
increases and holding a put option on the same stock which yields a positive 
return if the price of the underlying asset falls. The total value of such a portfolio 
is then π = P(V) +VPV. 
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The total return on this portfolio is influenced by two factors: first, the 
change in the value of the option to privatize, P(V) and second, the change in the 
value of the “stock” price, V. Hence the change in total return on the portfolio is: 
 
dVPdPd V+=π                             (21) 
 
Expanding dP using Ito’s lemma and substituting in (21), we obtain: 
 
[ ] [ ]dtVVPVdzVdzVdtPd VAVRVVAVARVRVV 2222212 σσσσαπ ++++=    
         
AVVARVVRVVVAVVVRVV dzVPdzVPdtPVPVVPd σσσσαπ 222
1
2
12 2222 ++

 ++=    (22) 
 
Taking the expectation of equation (22) yields: 
 
dtPVPVVPdE VVVAVVVRVV 

 ++= 2222
2
1
2
12)( σσαπ            (23) 
 
No arbitrage condition states that the expected change in the return on the 
portfolio should equal the riskless interest rate; that is, E(dπ) = r. Then, the return 
on the portfolio whose value is P(V) - VPV  should be equal to the riskless return. 
Hence, we have:  
 
[ ] dtPVPVVPdtVPPr VVVAVVVRVVV 

 ++=− 2222
2
1
2
12 σσα            (24) 
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In equation (24), the left hand side is the riskless return on the hypothetical 
portfolio and the right hand side is the expected return on the portfolio. 
Rearranging and dividing both sides by dt, we end up with the following second 
order Cauchy differential equation: 
 
( ) 02)(
2
1 222 =−+++ rPVPrPV VVVVVAVR ασσ                              (25) 
                                                                                
As I have argued in Introduction, the government’s problem can be seen as 
an optimal stopping problem. That is, at each point in time, the government 
assesses whether to maintain public ownership (i.e. continue to delay 
privatization) or to auction the forest (i.e. stop and realize the termination payoff 
K-V). Hence, the solution of equation (25) indicates the optimal stopping region 
for the government. However, boundary conditions must be specified to solve 
equation (25). The first boundary condition that can be imposed follows from the 
option theory:   
 
0)(lim =∞→ VPV                  (26) 
 
Boundary condition (26) states that as the value of the forest increases, the 
option value to wait tends to zero. Equation (26) has a clear analogy to stock 
options. One would expect the value of a put option to decrease as the price of the 
underlying stock tends to infinity. 
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However, equation (26) alone is not sufficient to solve the second order 
differential in equation (25). Equation (25) holds for the region where V>V*. One 
is also interested in how the function behaves at the boundary V=V*. We can 
impose continuity at the boundary: 
 
P(V*) = K – V*                  (27) 
 
Equation (27) is called the value-matching condition because it matches the 
value of P(V*) to the termination payoff. However, since the boundary V(t) is 
unknown, we need a third condition that specifies the behavior of the free 
boundary at V*. Boundary condition (28), known as the smooth-pasting condition 
ensures the solution of the free boundary problem:     
 
PV(V*) = -1                             (28) 
 
Boundary condition (28) is called the smooth-pasting condition because it 
ensures that the slopes of the two functions coincide at the boundary.  
 
To obtain an expression for P(V), equation (25) must be solved subject to the 
boundary conditions (26)-(28). Since there may be more than one function that 
solves equation (25), the easiest method is to conjecture a solution and then  
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substitute in the problem to see whether it works. One possible solution to the 
problem is given by: 
 
21
21)(
ββ VBVBVP +=                        (29) 
 
where B1, B2,  β1 > 0 and β2 < 0 are constants to be determined.  
 
Boundary condition (26) implies that B1 = 0 in equation (29). Hence we end 
up with: 
 
βBVVP =)(                 (30) 
 
where B and β < 0 are constants to be determined. 
 
To obtain the threshold value V* and B, one only needs to substitute equation 
(30) into value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions in equations (27) and 
(28). Solving these equations for V* and B and substituting in P(V) yields:  
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where β is the negative root of a quadratic equation obtained by substituting 
equation (30) into equation (25): 
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Figure 5.The Quadratic 
 
( ) ( ) 021)(
2
1 22 =−++−+= rrQ VVAVR βαββσσ             (34) 
 
When β = 0, Q = -r and when β = 1, Q = 2 αv . Hence, we are assured that β 
has one root greater than 0 and another less than 0. This is shown in Figure 5. 
Since β is negative by the boundary condition (26), β turns out to be: 
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Equation (31) gives the critical value of the forest at which government 
privatizes the forest. The government privatizes the forest when the threshold  
  
 40 
 
Figure 6. The Critical Value of Forest and Privatization 
 
value, V*, is hit for the first time from above. Figure 6 illustrates this point. Note 
that Figure 6 is similar to Figure 3 where the case for αv < 0 was explored. It is 
useful to compare the deterministic and stochastic cases and assess the role of 
uncertainty. Let V*d and V*s denote the critical values at which the government 
privatizes in the deterministic and stochastic cases, respectively. From equations 
(18) and (31), these values are 
 
V
d r
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1
*
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Of interest is the effect of uncertainty on the timing of privatization. Since V*d 
holds for αv < 0, assume for now that αv < 0. When αv < 0,  
Vr
r
αβ
β
−<−1  
implying that V*s < V*d. Hence, uncertainty causes the government to privatize at 
a later date than it would if there were no uncertainty in the economy. 
 
A more formal way to assess the effect of uncertainty on privatization can be 
carried out through comparative statics. Note from equation (35) that β is a 
function of αv, σVR, σVA and r. Without loss of generality, the analysis can be 
carried out on σVR. The same results apply to σVA. Taking the total differential of 
equation (34), we have 
 
0=∂
∂+∂
∂
∂
∂
VRVR
QQ
σσ
β
β                  (36) 
 
where all derivatives are evaluated at β < 0 obtained in equation (35). Figure 6 
shows that β∂
∂Q  < 0 at β. In addition, differentiating Q with respect to σVR, we 
have ( ) 01 >−=∂
∂ ββσσ VRVR
Q . Hence, 
VRσ
β
∂
∂ > 0. That is, as σVR increases, β 
increases and β/( β -1) decreases since β < 0. This implies that the critical V* at 
which the government privatizes the forest decreases, ceteris paribus. In other 
words, as uncertainty increases, the government delays privatization. This result 
is also in line with the observation that the government privatizes sooner when 
there is no uncertainty in the economy. 
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Similar comparative statics can be carried out to determine the effects of 
changes in αv and r on privatization. Again, totally differentiating equation (34), 
 
0=∂
∂+∂
∂
∂
∂
VV
QQ
αα
β
β                  (37) 
 
where V
V
Q βαα 2=∂
∂ . Whether a change in αv causes a higher or a lower critical 
value, V*, depends on the sign of αv. If αv < 0, we have 0>∂
∂
V
Q
α , which implies 
that 0>∂
∂
Vα
β
. Hence, as αv increases, β also increases, bringing down β/( β -1) 
and the critical value, V*. This, in turn, causes the government to privatize later 
than it would otherwise, ceteris paribus. The case where αv > 0 produces the 
opposite effect. When αv > 0, αv and V* move in the same direction. Hence an 
increase in the expected rate of change of the forest implies that the government 
privatizes the forest sooner. This is also consistent with the results of the 
deterministic case where a positive expected rate of change implied immediate 
privatization of the forest provided that K > V initially.  
 
The same analysis applies to capture the effect of interest rate on the critical 
value, V*. Total differentiation yields, 
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where all derivatives are again evaluated at β. Since the risk-free rate is assumed 
to be positive, we have 01<−=∂
∂ r
r
Q β . This implies that 0<∂
∂
r
β . Hence, an 
increase in the risk-free rate decreases β and increases β/( β -1) and the critical V*. 
When V* is higher, the government privatizes the forest sooner than it otherwise 
would.  
 
As we have seen, certain parameters of the model must also be taken into 
account in the government’s decision to privatize. The comparative statics 
analysis has implications for government policies regarding the privatization of 
forests. For instance, if uncertainty in the economy increases, the government 
delays privatization since the value of the forest is more volatile. The expected 
rate of change in the value of the forest is another important determinant of the 
privatization. The government should privatize those areas with a positive 
expected rate of change sooner than those areas that are expected to decrease in 
value. This is because when the expected rate of change is positive, the 
privatization payoff decreases faster than the privatization payoff when the rate is 
negative.  
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Privatization is an important phenomenon. It is now regarded as one of the 
most essential tools to promote economic efficiency. However, privatization of 
natural resources and forests in particular is likely to meet resistance from a 
number of interest groups. The most salient conflict regarding the privatization of 
forests is between environmentalists and private firms. This thesis proposes a 
model that attempts to determine the optimal use of forests from the perspective 
of the whole society rather than a single interest group. The model, therefore, 
enables the government to decide on the optimal use of forests taking into account 
both economic rent and amenity value.  
 
As argued above, the government privatizes the forest when the value of the 
forest falls below a certain threshold value. The government realizes a return that 
is equal to the difference between the privatization price and the value of the 
forest. The private firm buys the forest in anticipation of future benefits such as 
the sale of timber and/or development of theme parks. The government can thus 
reduce the inefficiency that may be associated with the management of the forest 
while the private firm increases the value of the forest by managing it efficiently. 
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We have also seen that the decision to privatize depends on both macro-level 
parameters such as the amount of uncertainty in the economy as well as more 
forest-specific parameters such as the expected rate of change in the value of the 
forest. The uncertainty stems from both the prices of timber and the amenities that 
are derived from forests. 
 
The model developed in the thesis can be applied to other SOEs such as 
Tüpraş or Telekom since the fundamental intuition remains the same—that 
privatization is a put option of the government. Naturally, one should adapt the 
model to the setting where government privatizes a technology-producing firm 
rather than a renewable resource. In such a case, the government would be 
interested in the stochastic nature of innovation. That is, the control variable is the 
rate of innovation and the value of the assets of the SOE is determined by the 
stochastic evolution of technology over time. This, in turn, implies that the value 
of the firm’s assets is stochastic. However, the model must be extended to include 
jump diffusion processes since innovation can cause jumps in the value of the 
firm assets. 
 
There are, nevertheless, several limitations of the model, which, at the same 
time, are avenues for future research. First, the model dwells only upon the 
ownership structure of the forest. That is, the fundamental question is whether 
forests should be publicly or privately held. However, it does not address the 
conflicts of interest among private stakeholders. Private stakeholders do not 
constitute a homogeneous group. For instance, even if the government privatizes 
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the forest, conflicts of interest are likely to arise between forest dwellers who earn 
their livelihood from forests and private firms that seek to profit from harvesting.  
 
In addition, the model presents privatization as the sole policy tool. The 
model also applies to leasing contracts. However, leasing contracts might include 
restrictive covenants related to the use forest. For instance, the government might 
insist that harvests be lower than regeneration or that a certain degree of amenity 
as measured by some naturalness index be attained. It would be interesting to 
introduce the restrictive covenants and compare privatization and leasing as 
distinct policy tools. 
 
One fundamental motivation behind almost all privatizations is to increase 
the efficiency. As argued in Introduction, by privatizing forests, governments aim 
to reduce bureaucracy that may be associated with the management of forests. An 
extension of the model could explicitly recognize the role for efficiency. 
Specifically, the optimal time to privatize and the critical value of the forest at 
which the government privatizes should reflect the potential gains in efficiency. 
 
Finally, the model makes several assumptions that can be relaxed. For 
instance, the model assumes that growth of the forest is deterministic. This 
assumption can be relaxed since unforeseen ecological events such as the 
appearance of harmful insects or climactic changes are likely to alter the growth 
of the forest.  
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APPENDIX A. SECOND ORDER CONDITION 
 
 
 
To prove that the expression we obtained in equation (18) for T* indeed 
maximizes the value of the put option, we need to check whether the second order 
condition is satisfied at T*. The second order condition with respect to T is given 
by: 
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Recall that the optimal time to privatize is given by: 
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Substituting (A.2) into (A.1), we get 
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Equation (A.3) is negative since αv < 0. Hence, T* maximizes P(V). 
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APPENDIX B. THE SOLUTION IN THE STOCHASTIC 
CASE 
 
 
 
To check that the function P(V) we have come up with is indeed the solution 
to the differential equation (27) subject to the boundary conditions (28)-(30), I 
substitute the solution in (35) in equations (27)-(30). To reiterate, equation (35) 
stated that the value of the put to privatize is given by: 
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The first boundary condition states that as the value of the forest increases, the 
option value of waiting decreases. That is, 
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Since β < 0, the first boundary condition is satisfied. 
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The second boundary condition is the value-matching condition which 
imposed continuity at the boundary: 
 
P(V*) = K – V*                      (B.4) 
 
Substituting for P(V*) and V* in equation (B.4), we get  
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From (B.5), it can be concluded that the value-matching condition is satisfied 
at the boundary. 
 
Recall that the third boundary condition imposed that the slopes of the put 
function and the termination payoff coincide at the boundary: 
 
PV(V*) = -1                 (B.6) 
 
Substituting for PV(V*), we end up with: 
 
( )
( ) 11
1*)( 1
11
11
1
−=−
−−= −
−−
−−
−
β
ββ
ββ
β
β
β
β
β K
K
VPV             (B.7) 
 
  
 57 
Equation (B.7) shows that the smooth-pasting condition is also satisfied by 
P(V). 
 
Finally, we need to check whether P(V) satisfies the second order differential 
equation in (27). Recall that we had from equation (27): 
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Substituting for P(V), we get 
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Note that equation (B.9) is the same as the quadratic equation (36) from which 
I obtained the root β. Therefore, equation (B.9) is satisfied by construction and 
P(V) satisfies the second order differential equation as well as the boundary 
conditions specified. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 58 
 
 
 
